Abstract-Biometric signcryption, which enables a user using his biometric information as the identity to fulfills both the functions of encryption and digital signature simultaneously, and it provides better overall security and performance. However, almost all biometric signcryption schemes that have been proposed in the literature do not satisfy forward secrecy, known session-specific temporary information security and public verifiability with confidentiality, also have the certificate management complexity or key escrow issues which are inherent in traditional public key and identity-based cryptography respectively. In order to solve these problems, a novel biometric signcryption using certificateless public key cryptography is introduced, the formal definition and security notion of the biometric certificateless signcryption (BCSC) are presented, and a concrete BCSC scheme is also proposed in this paper. The proposed scheme eliminates the above security shortcomings and it does not have the certificate management complexity and key escrow issue by exploiting the certificateless public key cryptography. Moreover, the proposed scheme only requires one bilinear pairing operation, which makes it applicable to the resource-constrained communication devices and the communication networks with high security requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Signcryption is a high performance cryptographic primitive first proposed by Zheng in 1997 as an approach to perform both the functionality of encryption and signature in a single operation, and is more efficient than the sign-then-encrypt approach. In the early decades, many signcryption schemes [1, 2] have been presented using the conventional public key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, certificate issued by certification authority (CA) is used to bind user's identity and their public keys. This brings the complex problems associated all users certificate management including certificate generation, distribution, revocation and storage, as well as the communication and computation overheads of certificate verification. To mitigate the burden of conventional PKI, Shamir introduced the notion of Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC). In the IBC system, the user's public key is replaced by any binary strings that uniquely represent the user and the user's private key is generated and distributed by a trusted authority called private key generator (PKG), which gets rid of the certificates. The concept of identity-based signcryption (IBSC) was first presented by Malone-Lee in [3] . Subsequently, many IBSC schemes are proposed [4, 5] . However, in IBC all users' private keys are not selected by the users but rather issued by the PKG, which unfortunately introduces the key distribution and escrow problems, and also has the security risk since the PKG can decrypt and forge any signcryption in an IBSC scheme.
A new cryptographic primitive called certificateless cryptography was introduced by Al-Ryiami and Paterson [6] in 2003 in order to address the key distribution and escrow problems while avoiding the use of certificate which are inherent in identity-based and traditional public key cryptography respectively. In the certificateless cryptography system, the user's private key is divided into two parts. A trusted third party called key generation center (KGC) is also used to generate all users' private keys, but he only help users generate a partial private key. The other part of private key named secret value is selected by the users themselves and the KGC cannot obtain this secret value. In 2008, Barbosa and Farshim [7] proposed the first certificateless signcryption (CLSC) scheme along with a security model, where the model dealt with security notions of confidentiality and unforgeability for CLSC. Recently, a number of efficient CLSC schemes [8, 9] have been proposed in certificateless cryptography.
Nowadays, many security schemes use the user's biometric information as his identity instead of arbitrary strings like an IP address since the biometric data is unique and inherent for a user. Some work [10, 11] in applying biometric data to cryptography has focused on the extraction of a secret from biometrics. Sahai and Waters [12] pointed out in above biometric security schemes [10, 11] simply capturing a digital reading of someone else's biometric would (forever) invalidate approaches where symmetric keys are systematically derived from biometric readings, and they proposed a new type of identity-based encryption called fuzzy identity-based encryption (Fuzzy-IBE) that uses biometric attributes. But the public parameters grow linearly with the number of attributes in Sahai and Waters's Fuzzy-IBE. In 2007, Baek, et al. [13] presented two new Fuzzy-IBE schemes, in which the public parameters size is independent of the number of attributes. Later, Sarier [14] introduced a new and efficient biometric IBE (Bio-IBE) scheme and achieved better efficiency in terms of the decryption and key generation algorithms compared to [13] . In 2011, Sarier [15] proposed generic constructions for Bio-IBE that require no bilinear pairings. Recently, Qing [16] proposed a new Bio-IBE scheme in the standard model. In 2007, Burnett et al. [17] presented a biometric identity-based signature scheme in which the public key is constructed by a fuzzy extractor [18] . However, Sarier [19] showed that their scheme [17] cannot resist a type of denial of service attack and they proposed an improved scheme. In 2012, Li et al. [20] formalize the concept of biometric identitybased signcryption (Bio-IBSC) and proposed a Bio-IBSC scheme in the random oracle model. Recently, Wang and Tang [21] proposed a novel biometric signcryption scheme that is identity-based and group-oriented.
All the above biometric signcryption schemes [20, 21] do not adopt the certificateless cryptography, and have the key escrow issue. In this paper, we extend the notion of biometric signcryption to the certificateless setting, and define the formal definition and security notion of the biometric certificateless signcryption (BCSC). We also proposed a concrete scheme of BCSC and formally prove its security in the random oracle model. Our BCSC scheme has the following advantages: (1) The scheme achieves forward secrecy, known session-specific temporary information security and public verifiability with confidentiality (PVC) security attributes; (2) The scheme only requires one bilinear pairing operation, and if there exits a proxy server between the sender and receiver, the users require no bilinear pairing operation since our scheme achieves PVC; (3) The scheme eliminates the certificate management complexity and key escrow issues.
The paper is organized as follows. Some background on bilinear pairings and hard problems are introduced in the next section. The formal models of BCSC are proposed in Section 3. Then, we propose a concrete BCSC scheme and provide a security proof for it in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively. In Section 6, a comparison is discussed with existing schemes. Finally, this paper ends with some concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In order to introduce the new biometric certificateless signcryption scheme, firstly, we review the required mathematical preliminaries and definitions. Then we describe the fuzzy extractor method.
A. Mathematical Preliminaries
Let (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ·) be an additive and multiplicative group respectively of the same prime order q. The bilinear pairing is a mapê from G 1 ×G 1 to G 2 , which has the following properties. 
B. Fuzzy Extractor Method
Nowadays, many security systems use the user's biometric information as his identity, such as fingerprint, voice command, retina scan, and so on. However, two biometric inputs are rarely identical. In order to solve this problem, Dodis et al. [18] showed how to generate cryptographic keys from biometric data, and proposed a new approach called fuzzy extractor, which can extract a unique string ID U from biometric input w in a noisetolerant way. In other words, suppose the biometric input changes to be ŵ such that dis(w, ŵ) t ≦ , the string ID U can be reproduced exactly even if the approach is applied on a different ŵ, where dis() is the distance metric used to measure the variation in the biometric reading and t is the noise tolerance parameter of the fuzzy extractor. Three following metrics were used in the fuzzy extractor approach. 1). Hamming metric: the number of symbol positions in which the biometric input w and ŵ differ.
2). Set difference metric: size of the symmetric difference of two biometric input sets between w and ŵ.
3). Edit metric: the number of character insertions and deletions needed to convert w into ŵ.
Hamming metric is the most convenient metric and the other two are auxiliary. Based on the hamming metric, a cryptographic hash function H and a [n, k, 2t+1] BCH (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem) error correction code, Burnett et al. [17] proposed a concrete fuzzy extractor. The definition of the fuzzy extractor is as follows:
Let M={0,1} n be a metric space with finite dimensions, a distance function dis() is defined as M×M n →Z * and a
, where l is the length of the extracted output string ID U . The fuzzy extractor consists of two functions Gen and Rep. Gen: The probabilistic generation procedure Gen on a biometric input w ∈ M returns an extracted identity ID U = H(w) and a publicly reproduction parameter PAR=w ⊕ C e (ID U ), where is a one-to-one encoding function. Rep: The deterministic reproduction procedure Rep on a biometric input ŵ and the reproduction parameter PAR outputs
where C d is a decoding function that has an error threshold of t (can correct up to t-bit errors). If dis(w,ŵ)≦t, then
III. FORMAL MODELS OF BIOMETRIC CERTIFICATELESS

SIGNCRYPTION
In this section, we present the generic model and security model of biometric certificateless signcryption.
A. Generic Model
The model of biometric certificateless signcryption is constructed using the following five algorithms: Setup: On input of a security parameter k the KGC uses this algorithm to output master secret key and some public parameters prms for the system. PartialKeyGen: On input of a user U's biometric data w, public parameters prms and the master secret key, the KGC uses this algorithm to output the private key D U corresponding to w. KeyGen：Upon input of the user U's biometric data w and public parameters prms, the user U uses this algorithm to output the secret value x U and the public key PK U for the user U. x bP , * v ), where ξ=abP. So, if the adversary A i can defeat our BCSC scheme by learning something about the signcryption message, that means there exists an efficient algorithm to solve the CDHP with non-negligible advantage. However, so far, the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm to solve CDHP is negligible. Hence, our BCSC scheme is secure against any IND-BCSC-CCA2 adversary A i attack.
Theorem 2 (Unforgeability).
Assuming that the MInv-CDHP is hard, the advantage of any EUF-BCSC-CMA adversary A i against our biometric certificateless signcryption scheme is negligible in the random oracle model. Proof. On receiving the MInv-CDHP challenge tuple (P, aP, bP), where P is the generator of G 1 , the goal of the distinguisher C is to compute a
The challenger C chooses a random number s∈ * q Z as the master secret key, sets P pub = sP, sends the system parameters to A i and sends the master secret key to A 2 . The C answers a polynomially bounded number of queries as follows . KeyGen queries: A i picks the biometric data w. C chooses an index l ∈ {1,2,…,q k } first (suppose that C can answer at most q k KeyGen queries). On the i-th query, if i=l, C sets w l =w, x i = ⊥ and PK i = bP. Otherwise, C chooses a number x i ∈ * q Z at random and sets PK i =x i P. In these two cases above, C adds the tuple (w, x i , PK i ) to a list L u which is initially empty and answers PK i . H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 
So, if the adversary A i can forge a valid signcryption message of our BCSC scheme by learning something about the signcryption message, that means there exists an efficient algorithm to solve the MInv-CDHP with nonnegligible advantage. However, so far, the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm to solve MInv-CDHP is negligible. Hence, our BCSC scheme is secure against any EUF-BCSC-CMA adversary A i attack.
B. Further Security Considerations
In this subsection we will heuristically argue that our biometric certificateless signcryption scheme achieves the following two security properties and show that Li et al's scheme [20] does not satisfy these security properties. From the above analysis it is quite evident that the verifier without the knowledge of the plaintext message m can check the validity of the signcryption message in our BCSC scheme, which achieves public verifiability with confidentiality. Moreover, in our BCSC scheme, the receiver recovers the plaintext message m after he verifies the validity of the signcryption message, which improves the efficiency of Unsigncryption algorithm. But in Li et al's scheme [20] , the verifier without the knowledge of the plaintext message m cannot check the validity of the signcryption message and the receiver recovers the plaintext message m before he verifies the validity of the signcryption message.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our BCSC scheme with the Li et al's biometric identity-based signcryption scheme in Table 1 . We assume that two schemes use the same parameters <G 1 ,G 2 ,ê ,q> as defined in Section 2.
In the "security" column, the notations FS, KSSTIS and PVC refer to the forward secrecy, known sessionspecific temporary information security and public verifiability with confidentiality security properties respectively. Y denotes that the scheme provably achieves the security and N denotes that it does not satisfy this security.
In the "Computation Cost" column, the notations "Signcryption" and "Unsigncryption" refer to the overall computation costs not including precomputation overheads required in the Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt algorithms respectively, and we let MUL be the number of point scalar multiplications in the group G 1 , EXP be the number of exponentiations in the group G 2 and PAI be the number of bilinear pairing computations.
From the Table 1 , we can see that our BCSC scheme only requires one bilinear pairing operation, and if there exits a proxy server between the sender and receiver, the user requires no bilinear pairing operation since our scheme achieves PVC. As we all know, bilinear pairing computation in general is the most expensive operation in a signcryption scheme from bilinear pairing, although Li et al's scheme [20] has less multiplications and exponentiations computations, the computation time of our BCSC scheme is better since the time for 2MUL+2EXP is more than the time for one bilinear pairing operation. Moreover, our BCSC scheme satisfies the forward secrecy, known session-specific temporary information security and public verifiability with confidentiality security properties.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we define the formal notion of biometric certificateless signcryption and propose a concrete BCSC scheme from bilinear pairing. Our scheme admits a security analysis in the random oracle model. Moreover, The scheme only requires one bilinear pairing operation, and if there exits a proxy server between the sender and receiver, the users require no bilinear pairing operation since our scheme achieves public verifiability with confidentiality. Considering the resource-constrained communication devices and the communication networks with high security requirements, it may be that our biometric certificateless signcryption scheme is more applicable. Donghua Huang received the B.E. degree form the College of software, Nanchang University in July 2012. He is currently pursuing his M.E degree from the College of software, Nanchang University. His current research interests include networks security and cryptography.
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